Afghanistan as a student of
international and terrorism studies I
had always wanted to go but it was never
really supposed to happen because even
though what I studied lent itself to
government I never seemed able to find
the right place apply at the right time
or quite frankly be the right person
until suddenly oddly someone thought I
was my qualifications to work in Kabul
were sufficient but they hardly compared
to the outstanding accomplishments of my
subject matter expert colleagues what I
lacked in skill I harbored an enthusiasm
for the mission to train advise and
assist Afghan so there I was I showed up
with big ears and eyes and believing and
winning without knowing like most
unfortunately what it takes to win for
the first seven months I trained the
trainer instructing coalition advisors
who in turn assisted Afghan civilians
police and military members over time
though my hopefulness faded and I found
a sad home in doubt and his trust by
chance I crossed paths with the former
governance and rule of law advisor to
five previous four-star ICF commanders
with his mentorship I learned a great
deal I sharpened my ability to discern
and I began to deal in realism for the
next nine months I worked off base
directly with Afghans in the end I came
away with cautious optimism for
Afghanistan in a real sense and
appreciation for pragmatism when it
comes to making a difference bearing in
mind that today is about ideas that
challenge us I’d like to share one with
you that I would have countered with
gusto just a few short years ago no no I
would have told you that’s not how it
now I know there are wrong ways to help
my shift in perspective came with those
sixteen formative months in Afghanistan
where I saw that sometimes it’s better
not to help at all than to do so
unwisely challenging though it would be
there are no answers for how to fix
Afghanistan today that’s not why we’re
here instead I have three theories about
how to help one another and how not to
help one another whether as states
communities or neighbors well we need to
be better at together is recognizing the
help we give is not wanted or working
because there is value in stopping not
repeating that which consistently fails
help that fails to make a positive
change my first theory is that bigger is
not better nor is more only in some
cases can success be had by blanketing a
problem with large sums of money and an
influx of people looking back Great
Britain’s 18th and 19th century exploits
in Afghanistan were mixed but the
Imperial model overall usually resulted
in growth for its colonies and one of
the reasons for this success was because
Great Britain deployed a smaller
footprint of highly qualified
individuals willing and able to sustain
the mission in one place for years on
end if not their lives the model of the
model if you will was a man named
Alexander burns flawed in some respects
but deeply talented in most others Burns
was the kingdom’s brightest political
officer to Afghanistan in the 1800’s
that that’s because he he took it upon
himself to live among the people he
learned the language and he spoke it
fluently he knew the culture intimately
he wrote prolifically about his travel
and experiences and his copious notes
went on to better explain Afghan
people’s tribes and ways of life and
they are still referenced today Burns
was much like Lawrence of Arabia both of
them career
British statesman in one place they
didn’t just balance the books they were
there to ensure that colonial governance
functions smoothly day to day and their
approach was anthropologists like
because they were patient and happy to
live with like the people this made all
the difference
fast forward to late 2001 to the West
arrival in Afghanistan since then in 15
years literally millions of foreigners
have rotated in and then rotated back
out
this modern revolving door of personnel
strains the crucial cultural element
needed in Afghanistan above all else and
that’s trust in counterinsurgency clear
hold build depends as much on human
capital as it does on financial capital
and both can be misused I would argue
controversial maybe perhaps people
should be screened before they go to
execute the strategy do they really care
about winning hearts and minds in my
time as a trainer in Kabul I met more
than a few who did not care once while
leading a session on Afghan culture and
the importance of greeting one another
greeting their counterparts in dari the
local language a DoD civilian rolled her
eyes and interjected why should we say
hello to them what have they ever done
for us I was shocked
mostly I was discouraged the mission is
to help Afghans in Afghanistan if you
cannot bring yourself to say hello what
are you doing here
[Music]
it made me wonder money-wise millions of
dollars are spent per hour in
Afghanistan a great many things have
been done with this amount though not
without error issues began when instead
of asking how much to borrow this land
often the modus operandi was to transfer
cash when additional space was needed at
a later time or in another space there
was less maneuverability to negotiate
the West’s habit of paying exorbitant
sums in a country with his staggering
poverty as Afghanistan it went on to
limit our long-term sustainability
influenced expectations on both sides
and affect their culture always
problematic in Afghanistan is a penchant
for graft tidal waves of money made it
worse corruption has been deemed the
most significant threat to stability in
Afghanistan two examples spring to mind
here one quite big and well known the
other less so but more prevalent first
Kabul Bank was new to the development
scene in the early 2000s by 2010 just
under 1 billion dollars had been
swindled from its depositors by the
Afghan elite second an Afghan military
commander part of a training facility
agreed to build a separation barrier
between male and female barracks because
the women were being harassed this was a
project to be done with foreign funds
when the money was allocated he took it
and he built himself a personal pool
people are an investment when it comes
to helping others especially in
Afghanistan where there is nothing
without trust what would it be like to
scale down the mission go back to those
willing and able to live work among
Afghans for the long haul I think there
would be value in that old-fashioned
diplomacy it would cost less there would
be less opportunity to steal
and I bet there’s a strong chance that
Afghans would enjoy more stability than
they do now my second theory is that
change is restricted when change is
forced during the Taliban there were no
women’s rights in Afghanistan
Afghanistan still ranks among the lowest
in the world at gender equality and
integration in March 2015 a young woman
named for Honda was violent and killed
by a mob in downtown Kabul President
Ghani promised justice when in reality
the lawyer representing the victim’s
family was quietly asked to step down
from the highest levels of government
judicial proceedings for the men and
some women actually who beat farkhunda
who ran her over and dragged her by car
and then lit her body on fire were
appalling there were hundreds in that
crowd only 49 were accused less than
half were formally charged and every
sentence was later reduced unfortunately
too many conservative Afghans women just
do not have the same rights or worth as
men even so there is concentrated effort
by the West for Afghanistan to
incorporate women into its national
security apparatus in order to do that
Afghanistan has agreed to implement
international law in the form of a UN
Security Council resolution that enables
women to participate in post-conflict
reconstruction now there are some who
genuinely wants and actively strive
toward gender integration in Afghanistan
but this decidedly new initiative is not
as idealistic as one would hope in fact
its bolstered in large part by
substantial financial incentive as seen
in the last case of that missing
separation barrier Afghan women are
primarily seen as wives and mothers and
often physically separated from men who
are not family to include women in
uniform like men with men makes for a
sudden switch it’s a presume to us for
foreigners to come in and announce we
have women in our armed forces so should
that’s misrepresentative of real change
I think real change is not that easy and
here’s why
in 2010 the Afghan government set a real
ambitious goal we want 10% of the
National Defense and security forces to
be women in ten years five years into
that goal 0.5% of the army was women and
1.5 percent of the police was women they
have since gone back to the drawing
board on that to find a goal that is
more feasible for Afghanistan at the
highest levels of government there is
support for gender integration at the
micro level sharing authority with women
is not popular as a consequence Afghan
service women have serious complaints
passed over for promotion no facilities
verbal harassment abuse threats hearing
about the challenges of Afghan service
women directly from Afghan service women
got me thinking and it got to me
mostly what if this kind of push for
this kind of gender integration
admirable though it is is too much too
soon if there is more harm than good in
action right now maybe there is more
good than harm and utility in
old-fashioned conversation think of it
like ink blotting one conversation is
one dot over time that dot gains
traction a little bit by itself but once
it hits other dots of ink it grows it
becomes a blot in order to have women in
the in the services in Afghanistan
there’s a prerequisite a woman cannot
sign up by herself she has to have the
permission of her father brother or her
husband that’s why this is called gender
integration both of them that’s why it’s
important to create that exposure first
if you’re going to have Afghan women
serving their country perhaps having
weapons this is a drastically different
thing you need to talk about it first
ergo the value of all encompassing
conversation
whereby you introduce an idea to a
people before that idea simply manifests
itself before people can accept it my
third theory is that there are cultural
limits to what is possible and that this
is actually okay being a new person in a
new place is about being aware who is in
the same space how do they interact this
takes a lot of looking and listening
because as a change agent you’re
expected to fit into that setting you
are expected to respect that culture and
adapt to it as best as you can
regrettably many change agents show up
and ask what are my goals according to
what I know when the wiser question is
what are realistic goals according to
the host audience and their culture some
years ago there were reports that
coalition personnel working with a
village without local access to water
bill to well in that village to help it
seemed logical it was part of
counterinsurgency strategy to assist
rural villages later when coalition
personnel returned they found the well
destroyed those of you who have seen
Tina Fey and whiskey-tango-foxtrot may
already be familiar now the reports they
suggested that village women were to
blame because they couldn’t walk and
talk on their way to get water had a
woman that involved in this an Afghan
woman been involved in the
decision-making maybe the outcome would
have been different I would argue that’s
that’s probably a measure that’s too
much too soon for Afghanistan and for
conservative rural areas which accounts
for 80% of the population had someone
been present someone else a foreigner
maybe who knew more about Afghan women
and village culture we could have
avoided the security risk for one and we
could have saved money spent on an
unwanted well to be a respected change
agent you have to know an audience so
well as to know what goals are
appropriate what goals will challenge
their cult
but also drive it forward in a quiet way
you have to be willing to guide that
audience many people at one time toured
and through that goal with confidence it
takes a lot of looking and listening and
adapting because they’re not going to
adapt to you it’s on you as the guest to
adapt and there are entirely too many
change agents who don’t but that’s
what’s expected of you you have to know
when to improvise when to modify your
goal when to scrap it and start
completely from scratch or do more
research in April 2015 after that
conference I got a chance to visit a
Kabul orphanage and in our multiple
convoys we carried monster sized boxes
brimming with different kinds of toys
the children all 88 of them were
overjoyed to see us and us them and then
they saw the toys and then chaos because
they had nothing they wanted everything
we were so looking forward to going
there to meeting them to seeing young
people giving them something we thought
they would like but we hadn’t
coordinated our gift with the orphanage
staff so we didn’t know and we didn’t
think that bringing toys would also
bring mayhem two months later we packed
88 mostly the same school kits the boys
and girls were happy we were happy it
was simple it worked
changing course with the kids was a
reminder that big go big this this does
not always apply and I know we like to
apply it but it doesn’t work all the
time it’s a reminder that force change
tends to be inadequate and it’s a
reminder that there are assistance goals
somehow I made it to Afghanistan and
what I learned and internalized is that
there are many ways people can make
change and help not all of which are
effective are appropriate for instance
you can
blast Rock to radically alter a
landscape or you can learn to control
explosions as in the kinds inside our
car engines that propel us and others
forward making and managing those bursts
of change among people takes profound
dedication helping Afghanistan it’s the
macro version of helping others where
the micro rule still applies help others
for the sake of helping them what Plato
would describe is truly noble and
morally right the only real reason to
give help helping others for the sake of
helping them forces us URI as a system
as change agents to be more deliberate
and if that’s not our reason it’s likely
the wrong way to help from the get-go
and that’s a problem for the change
agent not the audience a slower
old-fashioned road may very well lead us
to more valuable ways to inspire others
to create and control those bursts of
change for themselves
and not be afraid of it that’s when help
is right and when lasting change is possible thank you